The Vienna Document and the Russian challenge to the European Security Architecture by Schmitt, Olivier
Syddansk Universitet
The Vienna Document and the Russian challenge to the European Security
Architecture
Schmitt, Olivier
Published in:
Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact
Publication date:
2018
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license
CC BY-NC-ND
Citation for pulished version (APA):
Schmitt, O. (2018). The Vienna Document and the Russian challenge to the European Security Architecture. In
B. Heuser, T. Heier, & G. Lasconjarias (Eds.), Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact (pp.
269-284). Rome: NATO Defence College.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 01. maj. 2018
269
14
The Vienna Document
and the Russian challenge
to the European Security Architecture
Olivier Schmitt
Introduction
In 2016, Russia refused to re-issue an updated version of the so-called 
Vienna Document (VD), an arms control agreement designed to increase 
transparency on military activities in Europe. Russia also withdrew the four 
proposals it had circulated to modernize the Vienna Document, arguing 
that the political climate was not appropriate for such negotiations, 
and has since then declined to engage on any update of the VD. These 
decisions occurred against the backdrop of increased Western concerns 
following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a rise of military incidents 
involving Russian and Western forces (more than 60 between 2014 and 
2016)1. This paper traces the origins of the Vienna Document, its place 
in the European security architecture, and shows that the current crisis is 
the crystallization of both weaknesses in the implementation of the VD 
and a long-standing Russian dissatisfaction with most conventional arms 
control agreements in Europe. 
The Vienna Document in the European Security Architecture
The Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 
1  Lukasz Kulesa, Thomas Frear and Denitsa Raynova, ‘Managing Hazardous Incidents in the Euro-Atlantic 
Area: A New Plan of Action,’ European Leadership Network, November 2016. 
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(usually referred to as the ‘Vienna document’) was initially adopted in 
1990, and reissued in 1992, 1994, 1999 and 2011. It is originally a 
major result of the Cold-War era Helsinki process, which also enabled the 
transformation of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) intothe Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) in 1995. The VD is still handled within the OSCE framework, 
by a special body called the Forum of Security and Cooperation (FSC). 
The core philosophy of the Vienna document is that increases in military 
transparency (especially military exercises) reduces the element of 
surprise, thus leading to improved trust in relationships, diminishing the 
risks of miscalculation and misperception, and benefiting the security of 
all parties to the document. 
The Vienna document is part of the European security architecture, 
which is a complex entanglement of military alliances (such as NATO 
and the CSTO) and bilateral (or minilateral) military partnerships, 
economic-political organizations (such as the EU), as well as nuclear and 
conventional arms control mechanisms. As such, the Vienna document 
cannot be considered in isolation from other pillars of the European 
security architecture, and specifically other conventional arms control 
mechanisms. 
Jozef Goldblat defines arms control as: 
‘a wide range of measures […] intended to: (a) freeze, limit, reduce 
or abolish certain categories of weapons; (b) ban the testing of certain 
weapons; (c) prevent certain military activities; (d) regulate the 
deployment of armed forces; (e) proscribe transfers of some militarily 
important items; (f ) reduce the risk of accidental war; (g) constrain or 
prohibit the use of certain weapons or methods of war; and (h) build up 
confidence among states through greater openness is military matters’2
In Europe, the three pillars of conventional arms control are, 
2  Jozef Goldblat, ‘Arms Control – Basic Concepts,’ Fichas Marra (February 2011). Available at https://
fichasmarra.wordpress.com/2011/02/01/arms-control-basic-concepts/ (last access, 11 April 2017). 
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respectively, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (also 
called CFE treaty), the Open Skies treaty and the Vienna document. 
Those three mechanisms are distinct evolutions from original initiatives, 
and were not initially conceived of as part of a coordinated agreement3. 
Yet, in combination, they provide an overarching arms control framework 
with the CFE Treaty establishing a balance of conventional forces; the 
Open Skies treaty providing mechanisms of transparency (through 
aerial observation) and the Vienna document instituting confidence 
and security-building measures (CSBMs) related to military activities. 
In particular, the Vienna Document establishes CSBM concerning 
specific military activities conducted within its zone of application4. 
The mechanism is a ‘global exchange’ of military information, area 
inspections, notification of force structure and disposition, military-to-
military contacts and observation visits. Overall, the intent is to ‘foster 
transparency and trust through purposely designed cooperative measures. 
They help clarify states’ military intentions, reduce uncertainties about 
potentially threatening military activities and constrain opportunities 
for surprise attack or coercion’5. This is particularly important since 
Russia decided to suspend its participation to the CFE Treaty in 2007, 
denouncing the treaty’s ‘divorce from reality.’ While analyzing the 
motivations and consequences of this decision is outside the scope of 
this paper, this move weakens the European security architecture, but 
also results in reinforcing the importance of the Vienna document as 
a mechanism to reduce uncertainty on the status of military forces in 
Europe. 
It is important to mention that the Vienna Document, unlike the CFE 
and Open Skies, is not an international treaty. It is a political agreement 
3  On the history of those mechanisms, see Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order. The 
Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995, and Peter Jones, Open Skies. Trans-
parency, Confidence-Building and the End of the Cold War, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014. 
4  See the text of the Vienna document for specifics. Available at: https://www.osce.org/
fsc/86597?download=true (last access: 11 April 2017). 
5  Jeffrey A. Larsen, ‘Strategic Arms Control Since World War II,’ in Robert E. Williams and Paul R. Viotti 
(eds.), Arms Control: History, Theory and Policy, Santa Barbara, Praeger Security International, 2013, p. 230. 
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which, in itself, is not subject to international law per se. Therefore, 
non-compliance, non-conformity or violations of the provisions of the 
document do not constitute breaches in international law. As a Western 
diplomat put it: ‘the potential cost of breaching the document is political: 
it is about publicly calling on a country and expose it as non-cooperative 
and non-transparent’6. This is related to the nature of arms control itself: 
one must never forget that arms control takes place in the context of 
an adversarial relationship. Countries carefully calibrate agreements by 
assessing the security benefits of limiting their own and their adversaries’ 
military resources: arms control agreements are a way to freeze the 
‘race-to-the bottom’ logic of security dilemmas, but they do not solve 
those dilemmas. Therefore, arms control agreements are not an end in 
themselves, but a means to facilitate a cooperative relationship. Inversely, 
those agreements are very sensitive to changes in the political climate 
between signatories, and their implementation is subject to fluctuations: 
‘when it comes to the Vienna document, success is measured in 
enthusiasm. If states willingly exchange information, we can consider it 
a success; otherwise, it is a sign of increased political tensions’7. As such, 
enthusiasm for the Vienna document has been fluctuating since its initial 
adoption, mirroring the evolution of the political climate in the euro-
Atlantic area. 
First Steps of the Vienna Document
Just after the end of the Cold War, the Vienna document was quickly 
and significantly reinforced in several ways compared to the original 1990 
iteration. The 1992 revision decreased the thresholds of personnel (13.000 
to 9.000) and main battle tanks (300 to 250) requiring prior notification 
before conducting a military activity and the zone of application was 
expanded to include former members of the USSR. The 1994 re-
issuance created the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI) 
6  Interview, March 2017. 
7  Interview, OSCE official, March 2017. 
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as a transparency measure, expanding the obligatory data provided by 
member states to include command structure, major weapons systems 
(and associated technical data), and strength and location of forces. 
Some problems of circumvention, violation and non-compliance were 
already emerging, specifically from countries actively or recently engaged 
in armed conflicts (notably Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia and 
Uzbekistan). Yet support for the new regime was still high, overshadowing 
what was perceived as minor, and largely technical, issues. The 1994 
CSCE annual report stated: 
‘The Fourth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (12-14 
April 1994) once again called the attention of participating States to the 
problems of compliance with all obligations stemming from the Vienna 
Document 1992, in particular with regard to information exchange. 
Those problems were essentially attributed to technical difficulties and 
inadequate knowledge of the relevant provisions’8 
The first major test for the Vienna document occurred during the 
first Chechen War (1994-1996), with Russia initiating major troop 
deployments, allegedly in contradiction to the provisions laid out in 
the VD. At the time, Russia justified withholding notifications of these 
movements, arguing that the Chechen operation was an internal Russian 
issue and that the military moves were of no consequence for other 
states. This interpretation was rejected by other signatories, and Moscow 
grudgingly acknowledged that the CSBMs were still applicable to internal 
security situations. The outcome was a testimony of the flexibility and 
utility of the CSCE/OSCE’s consultative mechanisms and conciliatory 
approach, but it must also be noted that the Chechnya operation 
initiated a Russian pattern of violating the provisions of the document 
when deemed suitable, with few consequences. Therefore, despite what 
could be considered a favourable outcome, an observer noted in 1997 
that, ‘Russia displayed an utter disregard for its commitments under the 
Vienna regime in its Chechnya operation. The full implications of this 
8  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Annual Report 1994, p. 19. 
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incident for the regime remain to be played out’9. 
The interpretative disagreement regarding the universal application of 
CSBM provisions in case of domestic employment of military force also 
played out during the second Chechen War (1999-2009). NATO members 
continued to press Moscow for full disclosure of its military activities, 
which led Russia to host two inspection visits (albeit with a number of 
constraints). Moscow considered that it had demonstrated ‘exceptional 
goodwill and transparency’ but, despite several observations of Moscow’s 
non-compliance with the Vienna document and the Code of Conduct 
on Political-Military Aspects of Security (notably protection of civilians 
and proportionate use of force), there were no formal consequences, the 
OSCE and the member states accepting Moscow’s ‘good faith’ argument. 
This pattern of violation/acceptance of goodwill/no consequences was 
repeated many times during the second Chechen War, which led the 
OSCE to ‘at least allowing, if not excusing, Russian behavior in Chechnya,’ 
thus weakening the Vienna document because of those ‘egregious and 
hypocritical contradictions’10. The 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo 
created further challenges for the Vienna document. NATO countries 
initially failed to notify their military activities, leading Belarus to request 
clarification for the conduct of the operation. Russia also conducted 
specific area inspections in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) and Albania, later complaining that its inspection teams 
had been denied access to areas where NATO troops were stationed, 
in contravention of the Vienna document, specifically accusing the 
United States of blocking such inspections. NATO members justified 
their refusals by invoking safety and force protection measures (as well 
as intelligence concerns considering Moscow’s closeness to Serbia) and 
the ‘areas or sensitive points’ provided under paragraph 78 of the VD 
1994. However, NATO countries were forced to acknowledge their lack 
9  Allan S. Kraas, The United States and Arms Control : The Challenge of Leadership, Westport, Praeger Pub-
lishers, 1997, p. 181. 
10  Rick Fawn, International Organizations and Internal Conditionality: Making Norms Matter, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2013, p. 135. 
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of compliance with the VD provisions, which led to a 2002 update of 
NATO military guidance (MC 453), specifically taking into account 
the VD in the operational planning and into command post and field 
training exercises11. Therefore, despite NATO’s goodwill in updating its 
procedures and Russia’s begrudging acceptance of the VD’s provisions, 
the regime was already facing its most important dilemma: how to ensure 
adherence to the VD’s fundamental provisions while at the same time 
keeping a ‘flexible approach’ towards violations in order to prevent states’ 
defection? 
Challenges of Compliance and Implementation
Even so, international support for the VD was still high, as demonstrated 
by its 1999 re-issuing, which included a number of important updates 
including increased site visits, inspections and observations, and containing 
new chapters on defence planning and regional security. However, the 
new version of the VD failed to take into account the transformation of 
armed forces that followed the end of the Cold War, to the extent that 
the thresholds for notification were considered increasingly inadequate to 
tackle the new military realities: 
‘While the general trend of force reductions in Europe has persisted, 
there has been a sharp increase of major weapon holdings in the Caucasus 
area. At force levels which would have been assessed ‘minor’ in Cold War 
Times, a war was fought. One might legitimately ask why the Vienna 
Document and other CSBMs have not played their expected role in early 
warning and conflict prevention during recent conflicts’12. 
Furthermore, between 2000 and 2007, the OSCE expanded its 
activities in numerous security-related issues, which strained resources 
and diverted attention from arms control instruments such as the CFE 
treaty and the VD. In that period, several instances of non-compliance 
11  Interviews, NATO HQ, February 2017. 
12  Wolfgang Richter, ‘A New Start for the Vienna Document,’ OSCE Magazine, Number 4 (2010), 17-18. 
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with the VD, particularly from Russia and Soviet successor states were 
reported, without further consequences. Such violations included several 
denials of access and entry, claims of ‘national procedures’ superseding 
VD provisions or extensive use of the notion of force majeure to deny 
visits and inspections13. Russia’s suspension of its CFE treaty compliance 
in December 2007 and the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 
2008 compelled the OSCE to be more attentive to the implementation 
of the Vienna Document. Results were disappointing as many arms 
control practitioners noted the OSCE’s diplomatic tendency to inflate 
positive results and downplay observed violations. The 2009 Annual 
Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) final report stated that 
95% of the inspections and 96% of the evaluations conducted in 2008 
‘took place in full compliance with the provisions and often in spirit of 
the VD99’14. This assessment was criticized by many practitioners as 
misguided and downplaying real issues of violations of VD provisions. It 
also seems that verification of non-compliance findings were on occasion 
challenged, and even overruled within some national chains of command 
owing to political decisions not to ‘name and shame’ specific countries 
for fear of their negative reactions. In the context of the aftermath of the 
Georgia crisis and the US-initiated ‘reset’ with Moscow, it seems that 
Russia’s violations were particularly overlooked out of concern that it 
would suspend its application of the VD as it had done with the CFE15. 
The 2011 re-issuance of the Vienna Document was perceived as a 
necessity, considering the evolution of the European security landscape 
since the previous 1999 iteration. The new version updated a number 
of technical issues related to timing, types, and format of visits and 
inspections. In addition, a new mechanism for the continuous update 
of the VD was adopted in 2010. Dubbed ‘Vienna Document Plus,’ this 
mechanism was supposed to grant greater flexibility to the document 
13  Interviews with multiple arms control practitioners, March 2017. 
14  OSCE, Nineteenth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting. Vienna, 3 and 4 March 2009. Consoli-
dated Summary, 26. 
15  Interviews with multiple arms control practitioners, March 2017. 
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with decisions being implemented immediately, unless decided otherwise. 
Yet the VD 2011 failed to reach consensus on substantial issues, notably 
reductions in thresholds for prior notifications of certain military 
activities, or increases in inspection and evaluation quotas. Notably, 
despite an attempt to address the issue of non-compliance, major topics 
were left unaddressed and unresolved by the re-issuance and following 
meetings. Those issues include:
- Uzbekistan’s de facto abrogation of its participation to the VD;
- Russia’s repeated manipulation of information and other forms 
of deception (including the exhaustion of inspection quotas 
through ‘self-inspection,’ e.g. Belarus inspecting Russia, and fake 
declarations);
- Russia’s over-declarations of ‘areas of sensitive points’ to deny 
inspection;
- The abuse of force majeure provisions as a means of denying or 
delaying inspection. 
Overall, Russia’s refusal to re-issue the document in 2016 must 
be placed in a larger context of the evolution of the VD since 1990. 
Most notable has been the tendency to overlook violations of the VD 
provisions in the name of good cooperation, especially with Russia. ‘The 
VD can only work if Western countries and Russia support it, and we 
must keep Russia in’16 was the dominating policy line in Western capitals 
and the OSCE secretariat for a long time, which led to many sanitized 
AIAM reports. This policy can certainly be placed in the context of a 
post-Cold War Western attempt to ‘socialize’ Russia within international 
institutions. Yet this policy also led to a relative weakening of the regime 
by circulating toothless assessments giving the (false) impression that 
violations were exceptional while at the same time signaling that such 
violations were inconsequential. 
16  Interview with a Western diplomat, February 2017. 
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The Russian View
Russia has its own history of disappointments with the Vienna 
document. The Russian MFA considers that the 1992 and 1994 versions 
of the VD were ‘real effective,’ but that from the 1999 version onwards, 
changes and improvements were mostly cosmetic17. Yet, Russia was active 
in promoting changes and circulating proposals to revise the VD. For 
example, in 2004, Russia proposed ‘holding a high-level seminar on 
military doctrines and defense policy in the OSCE area’18. Over the years, 
Russia pushed forward several proposals, the most significant being:
- A suggestion that countries conducting large-scale trans-border 
redeployments of manpower and equipment should be obliged to 
notify other states prior to deployment;
- A simplification of the procedure regarding unusual military 
activities (chapter III of the VD);
- Exchanging information regarding multinational rapid reaction 
forces;
- An expansion of CSBMs to include naval forces19.
Those proposals were usually declined by Western states for two 
main reasons. First, they were perceived as a way for Moscow to acquire 
information about Western armed forces which could not be reciprocated. 
For example, the proposal regarding multinational rapid reaction forces 
is clearly targeted at NATO, since Russia does not have comparable 
forces: Moscow would then have gathered military information on 
NATO forces without providing any information on its own military 
activities. Similarly, trans-border redeployments were interpreted as a 
means to monitor and constrain NATO activities. The second criticism 
was the lack of precision of the proposals, notably including naval forces 
17  Valerie A. Pacer, Russian Foreign Policy under Dmitry Medvedev, 2008-2012, Abingdon, Routledge, 
2016, p. 86. 
18  OSCE, ‘Statement by Mr. Sergei V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at 
the 12th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council,’ 7 December 2004. 
19  Interviews, OSCE, March 2017. 
279
in the CSBMs. For example, the proposed zone of application included 
northern Africa (although no OSCE member-state is in the region), and 
it was unclear whether coast guards would be included in the proposal20. A 
Western diplomat noted that this proposal was ‘similar to the Soviet style 
of diplomacy: proposing ambiguous and/or half-cooked ideas and letting 
us fill the blanks, so that they see how far we go and if they can obtain 
even more’21. By 2011, the Russian position on the VD has changed ‘due 
to the country’s on-going military reform efforts and because the military 
did not wish to see additional CSBMs’22. There is also a sense that Western 
countries use the VD and other arms control agreements as a means to 
constrain Russia. This interpretation is confirmed by a Western diplomat, 
who explains that ‘Russian delegates regularly accuse us of duplicity and 
of becoming more aggressive over time’23. These statements are consistent 
with evolutions in Russian military doctrine, presenting NATO as a 
threat; and of the Russian national security strategy, concerned with 
Western countries creating and encouraging ‘flash points’ of tension in 
Eurasia, at the expense of Moscow’s interests24. 
As previously mentioned, arms control agreements are heavily 
dependent on the evolution of the political climate. As such, current 
tensions regarding the VD do not come out of nowhere: they can be 
understood as crystallizing long-standing challenges in its implementation, 
coupled with renewed security competition with Russia which is 
intrinsically challenging for arms control agreements25. 
20  Interviews with Western diplomats, February-April 2017. 
21  Interview with a Western diplomat, March 2017. 
22  Pacer, Russian Foreign Policy under Dmitry Medvedev, p. 91. 
23  Interview with a Western diplomat, March 2017. 
24  Margarete Klein, ‘Russia’s New Military Doctrine,’ SWP Comments, February 2015; Olga Oliker, ‘Un-
packing Russia’s New National Security Strategy,’ CSIS Commentary, January 2016. 
25  Lionel P. Fatton, ‘The Impotence of Conventional Arms Control: Why do International Regimes Fail 
When They are Most Needed?,’ Contemporary Security Policy, 37/2, 2016, pp. 200-222. 
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The Ukraine Crisis and the Current Challenges to the VD
With Russia’s suspension of its application of the CFE treaty, the 
VD and the Open Skies treaty have become the main instruments to 
gather information about Russia’s military activities. In March 2014, 
an observation team was gathered by the OSCE to monitor military 
developments in Ukraine following Russia’s occupation of Crimea, 
conducting inspections along the Ukrainian border, but being denied 
access into Crimea. Moreover, Russia did not provide advanced notification 
of the estimated 40,000 Russian troops deployed near Ukraine’s eastern 
border. Yet, so far, according to the interviewees, the provisions of the 
Document are still (largely) being observed26. The main issue is related 
to the re-issuance of the document, which was scheduled for 2016 but 
blocked by Moscow. The official Russian justification for blocking the re-
issuance is worth quoting in full: 
‘the fate of the Vienna Document is inseparable from the general 
situation regarding European Security. Today the view was 
expressed that the consensus rule implies the responsibility of each 
participating State for its actions. We agree with this and should 
like to recall that over a period of many years Russia proposed to its 
partners the modernization of the Vienna Document. However, our 
Western partners invariably told us that it “should not be opened 
up” (today for some reason it is not thought fit to remember this). 
Our Western partners also frequently say that in the current politico-
military situation ‘business as usual’ with Russia is no longer possible. 
We are also in agreement with this – we have no need for the kind of 
“business” in which ever more demands are made of Russia. However, 
for some reason, our distinguished colleagues are not bothered that the 
adoption of a new version of the Vienna Document would send a false political 
signal that everything is rosy in this area and that we are harmoniously 
implementing optimistic plans from five or six years ago as if nothing 
26  Interviews, February-April 2017. 
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happened. 
The anchoring in NATO documents of a policy of military 
containment of Russia and the Alliance’s concrete steps in the military 
sphere rule out the possibility of reaching agreements on confidence-
building measures. We can envisage prospects for the modernization of 
the Vienna Document 2011 only if the North Atlantic Alliance abandons 
its policy of containment of Russia, recognizes and respects Russian interests, 
and restores normal relations with the Russian federation, including in the 
military sphere.’27 
This statement perfectly encapsulates Russia’s grievances and the 
reasons for the current deadlock, and they are worth discussing in detail. 
First, Russia acknowledges the current tensions in the European security 
architecture. There is no need to try to hide it: the conflict is there and 
even if it has not spiraled into armed hostilities between Western countries 
and Russia, the climate does not favour cooperation. As such, the Russian 
position is opposite to the approach favoured by Western countries. 
While the latter emphasize that because tensions are high, there is a need 
to develop CSBMs to manage the risks of misperceptions and escalation, 
Russia claims the opposite: because tensions are high, there can be no 
possibility of developing and implementing CSBMs. This also reveals the 
competing understanding of CSBMs measures: Western countries seem 
to conceive them as a technical step to manage tensions; Russia considers 
them as a political indicator of the quality of the relationship. 
The second important element is the issue of linkage that Russia 
introduces by making future developments on CSBMs conditional 
to a general discussion of the European security architecture, most 
notably NATO. The language chosen by the Russian delegation is 
perfectly consistent with the narrative of an ever-expanding NATO 
slowly strangling Russia, an understanding of the evolution of European 
security which is the polar opposite of NATO members’ perception of an 
27  OSCE, ‘Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation,’ 834th Plenary Meeting, FSC Journal 
No. 840, 9 November 2016. Emphasis added. 
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increasingly aggressive Russia28. Russia’s constant messaging at the OSCE 
can be summarized as ‘we haven’t changed, you [Western countries] 
have’29, while most Western countries are increasingly wary of Moscow’s 
renewed military ambitions. The language is also consistent with the 
idea initially presented by Dmitry Medvedev in 2009 of a ‘European 
Security Treaty’ which would encompass existing institutions but was 
resisted by Western countries on the grounds that it would duplicate the 
OSCE and give Russia the power of veto over NATO activities. Several 
Western diplomats were also hoping that the resumption of the NATO-
Russia Council would be considered by Moscow as ‘normal relations in 
the military sphere,’ but that hasn’t been the case, and Russia has not 
explicitly described what is meant by ‘normal relations’30. The current 
Russian refusal to engage with the VD is further demonstrated by Russian 
diplomats’ disinterest in the informal meetings organized by the FSC 
chair in order to voice concerns and discuss security issues in a more 
direct manner: they simply don’t attend such meetings31. 
Because of this tense situation, a number of important proposals 
which could help decrease tensions are not moving forward. In particular, 
a proposal to reduce the threshold of personnel (from 9000 to 5000) and 
material requiring prior notification has gathered wide-ranging support 
(with more than 40 countries in agreement), but is blocked by Moscow 
and allied Central Asian nations. This proposal is considered important 
among Western countries, since it is supposed to take into account the 
transformation of armed forces and military activities (towards force 
reduction and increase of firepower) since the end of the Cold War, 
when current thresholds were adopted. Other important proposals 
currently exist, notably regarding Chapter III of the VD: risk reduction. 
Specifically, there are efforts to update §16 (unusual military activities) 
and §17 (military incidents) in light of the military practices observed 
28  Richard Sokolosky, ‘The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security,’ 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 March 2017. 
29  Interviews with Western diplomats, February-April 2017. 
30  Interviews with Western diplomats, February-April 2017. 
31  Interviews, OSCE, March 2017. 
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during the Ukraine crisis. Here again, Russia’s refusal to engage blocks 
any development in those directions. 
As previously stated, the VD cannot be considered in isolation from 
other arms control agreements. Therefore, Russian efforts to block any 
engagement with the VD (thus limiting to a maximum outside oversight 
of their military activities), coupled with a disengagement from the 
CFE (permitting a military build-up) but a maintenance of the Open 
Skies Treaty (which may allow Russia to gather intelligence on NATO 
countries), may be seen as a concerning signal. As a Western diplomat 
put it: ‘it is as if they were trying to make us completely blind on 
their military activities. The only question is why?’32. Indeed, assessing 
Russia’s intention is, in arms control as in other areas, the key challenge 
precluding any form of engagement. In a nutshell, the difficulty is to 
know whether Russia is an insecure state (acting in reaction to an intense 
perceived threat which could be mitigated through skillful diplomacy), or 
a ‘greedy’ state looking for material and/or symbolic satisfaction through 
a transformation of the current international system which can only be 
stopped through effective deterrence.33 In the first hypothesis, the current 
deadlock is only temporary until Western countries and Russia manage 
to find some common ground to mitigate their mutual concerns and stop 
the race to the end of the security dilemma. In the second hypothesis, 
Russia has in fact already given up on arms control, its military considers 
it an unnecessary constraint, and Russian diplomats are only paying lip 
service to the OSCE until Moscow feels confident enough to completely 
shake off the current security architecture. 
32  Interview with a Western diplomat, February 2017. 
33  For a discussion of ‘insecure’ or ‘greedy’ states, see Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International 
Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010. 
284
Conclusion
This paper has traced the evolutions of the Vienna Document, and 
provided some context to the current deadlock. Is has argued that arms 
control agreements are particularly sensitive to the evolutions of political 
contexts, and the VD is no exception. As such, it is unsurprising that the 
current tensions between Western countries and Russia have affected it. 
But is has also illustrated that current difficulties are to some degree the 
result of a regime that was already weakened by permissive implementation 
measures and a culture of political consensus which overlooked past 
violations. The irreconcilable Western and Russian approaches to the 
VD (necessary because of the lack of trust versus unnecessary because it 
would signal ‘normal’ relations) make it impossible to foresee ant rapid 
progression in the situation, despite the urgent need better to control the 
present volatile military situation in Europe. 
